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Abstract. In this paper, we propose a new method for detecting unau-
thorized network intrusions, based on a traffic flow model and Cisco
NetFlow protocol application. The method developed allows us not only
to detect the most common types of network attack (DDoS and port
scanning), but also to make a list of trespassers’ IP-addresses. There-
fore, this method can be applied in intrusion detection systems, and in
those systems which lock these IP-addresses.
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1 Introduction
Currently, Internet information resources are actively growing, penetrating many
spheres of social life. Information technologies are being introduced not only into
private enterprises, but also in the provision of public services. With each passing
day, more and more confidential transactions are carried out via the Internet.
In connection with these trends, the question of computer networks security is
starkly raised. Attackers have developed and actively use many types of net-
work intrusion [1,2,3,4], most of which can be prevented by standard methods
of protection.
This article focuses on detecting and preventing network attacks of two types
that are impossible to prevent by the standard settings of information resource
software. This are ”Distributed Denial of Service” attacks (DDoS attacks) [4,5]
and port scanning, that are used to find bottlenecks in network information
systems. In recent years the rate of end-user connections to the Internet has
increased sharply, which has given rise to an increase in the number and intensity
of attacks such as DDoS. These attacks are highly damaging to the information
service, and at the same time simple in their execution. Port scanning is used
by hackers to conduct ”network intelligence”. In this article we would like to
propose a new method of detecting DDoS attacks and port scanning, based on
the Cisco NetFlow protocol [7,8].
NetFlow is a network protocol developed by Cisco Systems for collecting IP
traffic information. NetFlow has become an industry standard for traffic monitor-
ing and is supported by platforms other than Cisco IOS (Internetwork Operating
System) and NXOS (Nexus Operating System) [9].
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A network flow has been defined in many ways. The traditional Cisco defini-
tion is to use a 7-tuple key, where a flow is defined as a unidirectional sequence
of packets sharing all of the following 7 values:
– Source IP address
– Destination IP address
– Source port for UDP or TCP, 0 for other protocols
– Destination port for UDP or TCP, type and code for ICMP, or 0 for other
protocols
– IP protocol
– Ingress interface (SNMP ifIndex)
– IP Type of Service
The proposed method for detecting network attacks based on the traffic flow
model is described in [10]. Traffic models shows that two parameters, the load
of the channel and the number of active flows in it, must be used for a full
representation of the network state. In this paper, the criteria of abnormal net-
work conditions, which can determine the start of the attack, were formulated.
A more detailed model is described in Section 2. The values of these parameters
can be measured using the NetFlow protocol, implemented on Cisco routers.
In [11] and [12], the authors suggested that the traffic flow model can be used
for network security problems, in particular to detect network attacks such as
DDoS, port scanning and network worms. Also in [13] and [14], an attempt was
made to use the NetFlow protocol to detect DoS attacks such as Smurf and
worms W32.Blaster Worm and Red Worm.
The aim of this work is to show that the NetFlow protocol can be used for
the detection of DDoS attacks and port scanning, and to formulate an algorithm
to identify IP-addresses from which the attack is carried out. This algorithm
enables to the creation of ”black lists” of addresses that should be blocked to
prevent the attack. This article is organised as follows:
– Section 2 - describes the flow traffic model, on which a method for detecting
network attacks has been built
– Section 3 - experiment to study the various attacks
– Section 4 - the definition of the detection algorithm under consideration
– Section 5 - describes the Research Center of DDoS attacks at the Samara
State Aerospace University
2 Traffic model
In this paper, we would like to propose a method of diagnosing the backbone links
and testing it on existing networks. This method is based on a traffic model [10],
according to which the number of active flows can be considered as an important
characteristic of the real network state. Two variables, the number of active
flows and the utilisation of the channel, best describe the current network state.
Analysis of all data on the network, represented by individual points on the plane
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with axes, which are plotted the number of active flows and utilization of the
network, allows to the definition of three areas that correspond to qualitatively
different states of the network.
It has been previously shown [10] that the first part of the curve formed
from average values of the data produces a straight line, which ends with an
inflection point. The straight line corresponds to the part of the network that is
characterised by a minimal loss of IP-packets, less than a half of one percent. The
bent part of the curve corresponds to an overloaded network, and is characterised
by a significant packet loss of up to 5%, which reduces the effective size of the
transferred segment of the TCP/IP. The third, nearly horizontal, portion of the
curve corresponds to a completely unusable network with significant packet loss
of over 5%.
The distribution of total load tends to a normal (Gaussian) distribution, since
the total load of the studied channel is the result of multiplexing a large number
of flows that are independent of each other. The theoretical model allows us to
estimate the confidence interval for the working area of the curve:
B(t) = b(N + kA()
√
N) (1)
Here A() is the normal quantile function. Equation 1 indicates that the real
state of the network, described by the number of active flows N and the flow data
rate B(t), will be outside these limits in only 100%× of the total observation
time.
The traffic model presented here allows the formulation of a simple criterion
for finding anomalous network states: if several consecutive measurements go
beyond the confidence interval of =0.05, we can confidently consider problems
on the network. If we collect the data every 5 minutes, then the statistics of a
few hours will make it possible to determine all the parameters of equation 1
with reasonable accuracy.
Presumably, the network state will be out of the confidence interval during
the progress of a network attack. During port scanning, the number of active
flows will increase with a nearly constant load, as the data transmitted is only
limited to establish the connection and to close it. The channel load as well as
the flow number should sharply increase during the progress of DDoS attacks.
In order to prove these hypotheses it was decided to conduct two experiments
with network scanning and with a DDoS attack.
3 Experiment
In order to clarify the details of unauthorized intrusion, it was decided to perform
experiments that emulated attempted attacks. Experiments were carried out on
the network of the Samara State Aerospace University (SSAU).
Remote machines were used as the source of the attack which were located
in an external network. The utility Nmap was applied for port scanning, which
was ordered to carry out a full scan of all hosts on the network.
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A Web server was selected as the target during the progress of the DDoS
attack. A few computers located in the external network were the sources of
the attack. In the first part of the experiment the attacking computers sent
ping requests simultaneously within half an hour. In the second part of the
experiment the target computers were attacked (DDoS attack) with the help
of a specialised program, LOIC. The Web server was attacked with the use of
different types of traffic (HTTP, UDP, TCP) over an hour. Data were collected
from all experiments, which are then analysed to identify patterns of different
types of attacks.
Fig. 1. The experimental scheme
Flow data, that are the basis for the analysis, were collected from the bound-
ary router Cisco 6509 of the SSAU network. NetFlow collector nfdump [15] was
used to gather data from the router. NetFlow export data is taken for analysis
at regular intervals of five minutes. A file with the parameters of all the flows
recorded on the router is formed every five minutes. The parameters are listed
in the introduction, and include the beginning of the stream, the duration of the
stream, the data transfer protocol, source address and port, destination address
and port, the number of transmitted packets, and the amount of transferred data
in bytes.
The analysis of data collected during network scanning has revealed a sharp
increase in the number of active flows for almost the same amount of traffic
transferred (see Figure 2). Each scanning computer generated of the order of
10-20 thousand of very short flows (up to 50 bytes) within 5 minutes. In the
testing period the total number of active flows on a router that is generated by
all sources is about 50-60 thousand.
Figure 2 shows a graph of the network states, the X-axis displays the number
of completed flows N, the Y-axis displays the total load in Megabits per second
(Mbps). Each point on the graph reflects the network state of the preceding
five-minute interval, showing the dependence of the average channel load on
the number of active flows. The points correspond to the normal network state
and the triangles describe the state of the network, registered during a port
scanning. Segments are depicted on the graph’s parallel vertical axis and show
the confidence intervals for the average load calculated for five flow intervals
(20000-30000, 30000-40000, 40000-50000, 50000-60000, 60000-70000).
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Fig. 2. Port scanning
As a result of the experiment with the ping requests, it was found that every
attacking computer accounts for a very long flow of ICMP traffic, if we send
requests through a single port. The data has been subsequently written into a
nfdump file after the attack is finished, making it difficult to detect. It should
be noted that one active ICMP flow to identify the occurrence of a failure in the
information system is clearly inadequate; the number must extend to the tens
of thousands of requests.
Fig. 3. DDoS attack
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The analysis of modelling the DDoS attack by the LOIC utility also showed
a sharp increase in the number of active flows, along with an increase in the
traffic. The utility sends data in parallel to different ports of the target, thereby
creating a large number of short flows for up to a minute (see Figure 3). The
triangles show the network states recorded during the attack.
Thus, it becomes apparent that the NetFlow protocol may not only reveal
the start of the attack, but also determine its type. A detailed description of
attack detecting algorithms and work to create secure hosting services may be
found in the following sections.
4 Algotithm for intrusion detection
Our studies have revealed patterns, based on the NetFlow data, that allow the
IP addresses of the computers with which conducted DDoS attacks and port
scans to be determined. Based on these patterns we developed an algorithm for
attack detection. Before formulating the algorithm we will specify the format for
recording flow data:
– Date and time of flow
– Duration of flow (in seconds, up to thousandths)
– Transfer protocol
– IP address and source port
– IP address and destination port
– The number of transmitted packets
– The number of bytes transferred
The algorithm developed for the detection of attacks such as DDoS and port
scanning is:
1. Find IP-addresses of sources that generate a large number of flows.
(a) If the size of these flows is very short, up to 50 bytes, it is most likely
port scanning.
(b) If the duration of the flows is greater then this IP-address might be
carrying out DoS attacks.
2. Find IP-addresses of sources that generate very long streams (lasting more
than 5 minutes). The IP-address assignment can be carried out DoS attack
in this case.
If many IP-addresses from which a potential DoS attack are found, we may
classify this attack as DDoS.
In order to prevent any network attack, early detection is important to enable
steps to be taken to neutralise it. NetFlow data comes from the router from time
to time, depending on the settings. At the same time, a balance between the
frequency of collection of flow statistics and the time needed for processing is
also needed. Therefore it was decided to establish the frequency of querying the
NetFlow data to once a minute.
It should be noted that the NetFlow statistics provide information on flows
that are already completed. Since the flow is considered as active for a certain
time after its completion, completed flows also need to be considered active.
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5 DDoS attacks study centre (secure hosting creation)
We have developed practical algorithms that are implemented as a script in
Perl. The script has been installed on the protected server. NetFlow data comes
to the server running the NetFlow nfdump collector from the boundary router
(BGP) on the SSAU network every minute. The script receives a file with data
on entering flows. These data are processed by a script in accordance with the
attack detecting algorithm described in the previous section. A list of suspicious
IP addresses, from which an attack may be carried out, are produced as the
output of the script.
The processing time of the NetFlow data is very small (tens of a millisecond),
whereas the intrusion detection addresses will be equal to the period of the export
data from the router, i.e. one minute.
Suspicious IP addresses are entered into the database and all traffic from
those addresses are blocked by an iptables firewall [16] for 5 minutes. Iptables is
installed on the protected server, i.e. only the server is protected, not the whole
network. If necessary, the protection can be extended to a whole SSAU network,
blocking suspicious IP address on the boundary router. In the coming year we
plan to explore the possibilities of using the NetFlow protocol for the detection
of DDoS attacks, for a combination of several basic types of attacks.
The problem of preventing DDoS attacks, as well as unauthorized network
intrusion; do not lose their sharpness, so SSAU created the Centre for the Study
of Network Attacks. The main purpose of the new centre is to develop new tech-
niques to detect and prevent various types of unauthorized network intrusion.
Hosting that is protected from DDoS attack has been created inside one segment
of the university network. The method of protection is based on the method pre-
sented in this article. The server that is running the NetFlow collector receives
NetFlow data from the boundary router of university network. This data is then
processed to produce a ”black list” of addresses that are blocked by an iptables
firewall.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, the detection of attacks such as DDoS and port scans using a
flow traffic model was proposed, based on receiving data according to the Cisco
NetFlow protocol from the border routers. An experiment to test this model and
create prevention algorithms has been described. The experimental results have
confirmed that the proposed flow traffic model can be used effectively to detect
these attacks.
An algorithm for detecting suspicious IP addresses that can go attack was
suggested. These addresses can be used in intrusion prevention systems in order
to block them. Also, the algorithm for the detection of suspicious addresses was
implemented as a script that works in conjunction with a firewall iptables. This
system of detecting and preventing attacks such as DDoS and port scanning
was installed on the SSAU host network. In the future we plan to continue
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studying the possibility of using the NetFlow protocol to detect various types of
unauthorized network intrusion. It is also planned to create a network protection
system directly on the SSAU network boundary router using Cisco IOS features.
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